{"meta":{"database":"Global Social Engineering Impact Database","license":"CC BY 4.0 — attribute to Netarx Social Engineering Incident Database","url":"https://global-social-engineering-impact-da.vercel.app/incidents/2019-nikkei-america-employee-wires-29-million-on-fraudulent-management-instru"},"incident":{"slug":"2019-nikkei-america-employee-wires-29-million-on-fraudulent-management-instru","title":"Nikkei America employee wires $29 million on fraudulent management instructions","date":"2019-09","date_precision":"month","year":2019,"victim_org":"Nikkei Inc. (Nikkei America)","sector":"Media & Entertainment","country":"United States","primary_vector":"Business Email Compromise","secondary_vectors":[],"ai_involvement":"No AI reported","ai_notes":"","outcomes":["Wire Fraud / Financial Loss"],"loss_usd":29000000,"loss_kind":"direct_loss","loss_note":"About US$29 million (approximately 3.2 billion yen) transferred to a bank account controlled by the fraudsters; Nikkei said it was pursuing recovery.","records_affected":null,"threat_actor":null,"summary":"Japanese media group Nikkei disclosed in October 2019 that an employee at its US subsidiary, Nikkei America, had transferred about $29 million to a bank account controlled by fraudsters the previous month. The employee acted on instructions from someone impersonating a Nikkei management executive. Nikkei reported the matter to authorities in the United States and Hong Kong and said it was working to recover the funds.","how_it_worked":"Someone posing as a Nikkei management executive instructed an employee in the American subsidiary's finance function to make a large transfer, and the employee did so believing the request was a legitimate internal payment. The structure is the recurring one for cross-border subsidiary fraud: the target sits in an overseas office where head-office instructions arrive by email as a matter of course, where time-zone gaps make immediate verbal confirmation awkward, and where the seniority gradient discourages challenge. No independent check on the beneficiary account was performed before the money left, and the fraud surfaced afterwards during internal review.","lessons":"A hard rule that no single employee can release a transfer of this size without a second approver and a verified callback would have stopped it.","confidence":"Confirmed","sources":[{"title":"Media Giant Nikkei Loses $29 Million to BEC Scammers","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/media-giant-nikkei-loses-29-million-to-bec-scammers/","publisher":"BleepingComputer"},{"title":"Japanese media giant Nikkei says $29 million lost in BEC scam","url":"https://cyberscoop.com/nikkei-email-scam-bec-29-million/","publisher":"CyberScoop"}],"entry_type":"incident","url":"https://global-social-engineering-impact-da.vercel.app/incidents/2019-nikkei-america-employee-wires-29-million-on-fraudulent-management-instru"}}