{"meta":{"database":"Global Social Engineering Impact Database","license":"CC BY 4.0 — attribute to Netarx Social Engineering Incident Database","url":"https://global-social-engineering-impact-da.vercel.app/incidents/2019-uk-energy-firm-ceo-tricked-by-ai-voice-clone-of-german-parent-company-bo"},"incident":{"title":"UK energy firm CEO tricked by AI voice clone of German parent-company boss","date":"2019-03","date_precision":"month","victim_org":"Unnamed UK-based energy company (subsidiary of a German parent)","sector":"Energy & Utilities","country":"United Kingdom","primary_vector":"Voice Clone / Audio Deepfake","secondary_vectors":["Vishing (Voice Phishing)","Business Email Compromise"],"ai_involvement":"Suspected AI-enabled","ai_notes":"Fraud investigators at insurer Euler Hermes attributed the call to commercial voice-synthesis software that reproduced the German executive's accent and speech melody. The AI attribution rests on the insurer's assessment, not on forensic recovery of the tool.","outcomes":["Wire Fraud / Financial Loss"],"loss_usd":243000,"loss_note":"EUR 220,000, approx US$243,000","records_affected":null,"threat_actor":null,"summary":"In March 2019 the chief executive of a UK energy company transferred EUR 220,000 (about US$243,000) to a Hungarian account after a phone call from someone he believed was the chief executive of the German parent company. The insurer Euler Hermes, which covered the claim, said the caller used AI-based software to mimic the executive's voice. The money was moved on to Mexico and then dispersed. This is widely cited as the first publicly reported corporate voice-deepfake fraud.","how_it_worked":"The attacker phoned the UK CEO directly and presented as the group chief executive, a person the target reported to and whose voice he knew. The cloned audio carried the familiar German accent and cadence, which served as the trust signal that displaced any need for written confirmation. The pretext was an urgent payment to a Hungarian supplier that had to clear within the hour, and the caller promised the subsidiary would be reimbursed immediately. After the first transfer succeeded the fraudster called back twice more, once claiming reimbursement had been sent and once asking for a further payment. The CEO only balked when the promised refund failed to appear and a later call arrived from an Austrian number.","lessons":"Out-of-band callback to a known-good number and a dual-authorisation rule for first-time beneficiary payments would have broken the single-channel voice trust the attack depended on.","confidence":"Reported","sources":[{"title":"A Voice Deepfake Was Used To Scam A CEO Out Of $243,000","url":"https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/09/03/a-voice-deepfake-was-used-to-scam-a-ceo-out-of-243000/","publisher":"Forbes"},{"title":"Scammers deepfake CEO's voice to talk underling into $243,000 transfer","url":"https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/scammers-deepfake-ceos-voice-to-talk-underling-into-243000-transfer","publisher":"Sophos Naked Security"}],"entry_type":"incident","slug":"2019-uk-energy-firm-ceo-tricked-by-ai-voice-clone-of-german-parent-company-bo","year":2019,"loss_kind":"direct_loss","url":"https://global-social-engineering-impact-da.vercel.app/incidents/2019-uk-energy-firm-ceo-tricked-by-ai-voice-clone-of-german-parent-company-bo"}}